Tired of Your Neighbors? Just Take Over the World! (783-93)

The European imperialist urge first emerged in 1869 with the opening of the Suez Canal. Over 100 miles long and connecting the Mediterranean and Red Sea, the Suez Canal not only opened up an easier trade route with then-Bombay; the canal was tangible evidence of the Europe's increasing financial, political, and commercial involvement outside of the mainland. Egypt, through which the canal cuts, was a semi-autonomous Ottoman state steeped in debt and political hardship. It was not long after the opening of the foreign-funded Suez Canal that European interests (namely Britain) decided to intervene before the Suez Canal itself was at risk of damage from internal conflict. Thus, "new imperialism" was born. Unlike "formal imperialism," also known as "colonialism," new/informal imperialism refers to a more subtle exercise of power in which a stronger state allows a weaker state to maintain its independence despite a reduction in the latter's sovereignty (789). Such was the nature of British rule in Egypt, and although imperialism itself was not new to the European powers practicing it, this 19th century practice allowed for the advent of a second empire built on the back of industrialization, liberal revolutions, and the establishment of nation-states. The imperialist powers in Europe took a very utilitarian view of their international intervention; with just a little external push, these non-European countries would surely improve, and thus the international community would also benefit. The result of such utilitarian and interventionist thinking was the spread of informal rule of which Britain was the champion.

Imperialism was not without its opponents, however, the most influential of which were the social critic J.A. Hobson and the Marxist Vladimir Lenin. Hobson equated imperialism with capitalism and the financial monopolies to indirect rule. In Hobson's view, the bankers were as key to imperialism and governments; he observed that once Britain established power outside of its borders, London became the banking center of the world. Naturally, the Marxists were opposed to this unapologetic spread of capitalism. Lenin, as acutely aware of the economics of imperialism as Hobson, argued that imperialism was a product of the "internal contradictions" of a capitalist economy (790). However, non-European markets proved to be too poor to meet European needs, a fact which negates the economically based criticisms of Hobson and Lenin. Advocates of imperialism saw it as more essentially rooted in nationalism and cultural improvement, pioneering a 19th century sense of European supremacy which only hinted by Romantic exoticism. The various motivations for new imperialism worked with each other in such a way that the geographic and cultural landscape of the world would be forever changed; thus, the international community began the long process of globalization which would establish some powers, diminish others, and integrate races.

Repetition Repeated - Another Week-End Summary

After a very eventful week ending with a DBQ on the perspectives leading up to German unification in 1848, I think we are all ready to move onward and outward--which is just what Europe is about to do. The final discussions that were had this past week mostly revolved around the Bismarck and German unification; most notably, connections were drawn between the German "archconservative" and Machiavelli (our favorite Italian). Attention was also paid to the unification efforts of Italy, and the views of Mazzini, Cavour, and Victor Emmanuel took center stage. All of this took place against the dramatic backdrop of Romanticism and did very little to please the so-called architect of European peace until WWI, Klaus von Metternich, because the balance of power that was so carefully measured in Europe was about to be upset. (He was right.) The Crimean War and Russian expansionism also factored into our review of 19th century Europe, both of which are events that have defined Europe to the present day. Expansionism in general will define the next era of European history as the continent becomes too small for the lot of them.

Blame it on Napoleon

Dear Mr. Conroy,

The lack of a woman's suffrage movement in England actually goes all the way back to the Terror during the French Revolution. Although English development politically, socially, and economically has progressed at its own rate through much of history, the losses sustained in France at the time set back collective European feminism by about 20 years. First, the execution of the playwright-polemic Olympe de Gouges deprived women of an authoritative advocate of gender equality; Mary Wollstonecraft died in childbirth within two years, thus depriving the movement of a calculative supporter of equal education. Without the two strongest women of the era, no one advocated powerful representation of women as Napoleon drew up his Codes. In the Codes, women were expected by law to occupy a very specific role in the private sphere. Thus, the revolutionary spirit that allowed women to come into the public sphere was dissipated, the remaining women repressed. Had France taken a revolutionary stand and granted women (at least) some of the rights outlined in de Gouges' Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen, then perhaps the rest of Europe could have followed suit. Unfortunately, nothing happened. Women were denied, and the movement would not start up again until the early 20th century. Who wants to give the vote to those people who are occupied with housework?

That is not to say that women had no advocates in post-Napoleonic Europe; in England, the utilitarian Mill was an uncommon male ally, publicizing his belief that the education of women would embody "the greatest good for the greatest number." However, Parliament was wary of working class men voting, let alone an entire "domestic" population. Why was this the case? Wasn't the prospect of wealthy women voting better than granting the vote to a poor, uneducated man? The 19th century answer would be that women are only suited for the private sphere and should have nothing to do with the public one their husbands occupied. In the 1970s, feminists would develop a theory that the so-called domestic/public spheres that were thought to separate men and women actually related to genital structure. In short, a claim was made that women were denied the vote based on "biological discrimination." A woman's reproductive system is internal, so she shouldn't be bothered with politics and the world and human rights. Naturally, it's all Napoleon's fault for throwing woman's rights out the window in 1800.

Let's just say that we're lucky to have moved on from all that.

At The Risk [At the Risk] of Repetition

This past week, conversation in our little MEH blog ring has been dominated by nationalism, conservatism, and the critical theory behind modern national identity. From theories that globalization has redefined the boundaries of a nation to the idea that racial and linguistic differences have little to do with defining a nation, the most basic composition of our larger communities has come into question. In addition to this self-reflection on nations and nationalism, we have all started thinking more deeply about how the economy will affect our futures. Not all of us believe that the proletariat is truly willing or able to jump start the apocalypse, but the morose musings about the future of the bourgeoisie in class certainly got us thinking about Marx (also known as Mr. Presumes-A-Lot). From Bismarck to Engels, this week has been all about those larger philosophies in our lives, the ones that bind us together and define the political and social sensibilities of our generation.

In Case You Thought Politics Were Fake (754-767)

Nationalism, it seems, is quite useful to the discerning politician; it can be manipulated from the top down or the bottom up. It can be divisive. It can be unifying. The most successful leaders during the period following the 1848 revolutions utilized nationalism to the fullest extent, regardless of whether or not they believed in nationalist ideology. Two examples of fruitful unification efforts were Italy and Germany. In Italy, competition between nationalist doctrines created a turbulent but effective climate in Italy in which unification became possible. From the vision of the third Rome painted by Mazzini to the top-down ministrations of Cavour, national pride was used to expand the scope and the influence of the unifying Italian state. For a divided country, one concept of nationalism could not be as effective; if Mazzini, Cavour, and Garibaldi all shared the same ideology, it would fall on deaf ears in some regions and be widely lauded in others. Therefore, the competition between them (although often violent) accommodated Italian diversity in such a way that the need to unify was universal. By 1871, after many conflicts between Cavour and the grassroots nationalist Garibaldi, Italy was geographically unified and the subsequent steps toward nation building could be taken. In Germany, Realpolitik defined the power dynamics that would allow for unification of the German state under Bismarck; it was the building of "national feeling," consideration of middle-class interests, diplomacy, violence, and regime struggles that would define this consolidation effort. The success claimed in Versailles, 1871, came not of the direct work of a leader, but rather the Realpolitik that the German Empire found universally appealing. Nationalism in these instantiations proved to be of more help than hindrance to the cause of unification, but if misused (as it was in many cases), it could drag out the conflicts between regions for indefinite periods of time.

Further Contemplations of Modernity

This post is a continuation of the discussion here.

This is where we could start getting into an argument about modern vs. contemporary. I disagree that the term "modern" is empty when separated from the modernist movement. Not every age is modern in the scope of history, nor does modernist doctrine make this claim. (Although according to the Cult of Postmodernism, it is possible that every era since the beginning of time has been postmodern.) Classicism, for example, was in no way modern. It was a reversion to a previous artistic period, and the fact that it came to be in a revolutionary climate does not make it any more avant-garde than the technique merits. However, classicism at the time of its conception was contemporary--momentarily modern. Of course, in the scope of history, such contemporaneity is cast aside, and the more enduring traits of an era become its defining points, traits that determine the objective modernity of a time.

Modern vs. Modernist

Dear Classier Hoeing and Natewozere,

I would first like to make the important distinction between "modern" and the modernity implied by "modernism." In my previous post, "The Mean Nurse Returns," I assert at the end that Romanticism can be considered the first modern period in the long progression of European history. By calling Romanticism "modern," I was not relating it in any way to the subsequent modernist movement; as you both have pointed out, Modernism and Romanticism are completely different animals, and any relationships between them are most likely due to the fact that one happened to follow the other chronologically. To conflate the two is a mistake, but should they have to be related to rationalize Romantic modernity?

I agree that Romanticism was not the pinnacle of artistic and social individualism; one can identify the so-called Romantic art and poetry with practiced ease. In some ways, the Romantics have become the well-known cliches of the present day--which would not be the case if Romantic artists were radically different from one another. (Perhaps the contemporary conception of the Romantic cliche is also what impedes our understanding of Romanticism as a form of the avant-garde or the modern.) Despite the inadvertent homogeneity of Romantic technique, the irrevocable shift in attitude towards the nature of the individual is ultimately what labels it as a modern movement. Prior to Romanticism (even during the Enlightenment), a philosophical assumption was made that humans are fundamentally good, rational creatures. With the advent of thinkers such as Nietzsche and Freud in the 19th century, the perception of the individual emphasized the irrational and animal in us--hence, the Id. Romanticism may not have artistically demonstrated the full potential of individualism, but the simple reconsideration of the nature of the individual pegged Romanticism as a heterogeneous movement. A modern movement, even, since it was more experimental than those that had preceded it.

The Mean Nurse Returns (725-732)

Oft called the "most significant cultural revolution in the 19th century," Romanticism was an eclectic reaction against the Classicism that was pioneered by David (alone) during the previous century (725). Artistically, there was a noticeable shift away from the (homogeneous) style embodied by David; suddenly, style was individualized and permeated by decidedly non-classical subject matter such as the exoticism of the Orient embodied in Ingres' La Grand Odalisque. Paintings were no longer confined to strict representational subject matter or composition. It was as if, as Constable wrote, "it is the soul that sees." Constable's assertion was not his own, but rather that of the Romantic poet Wordsworth; Romanticism was highly interdisciplinary, with poets striving to capture the visual essence of their life and times and painters attempting to depict the poetry of the rainbow. Thus, the limits of reason and human emotion were tested; humans were no longer assumed to be rational, but rather highly intuitive and irrational creatures steeped in subjectivity. This temporal shift in belief fueled not only the artistic community, but also early 19th century nationalism and politics. Romantics could be intensely liberal--

VICTOR HUGO: "Romanticism, so often ill-defined is only...liberalism in literature. Liberty in Art, Liberty in Society, behold the double banner that rallies the intelligence."

Romantics could also be highly conservative--

CHATEAUBRIAND: "I wrote a book called The Genius of Christianity. Need I say more?"

Romanticism marked the movement away from the Enlightenment that would facilitate the development of a modern society; perhaps even the Romantic era could be considered modern in and of itself, although by no means modernist. Perhaps rather than measuring our cultural progression in regards to modernism, we should be considering it in relation to Romanticism. Wouldn't we all prefer to live in a Postromantic era?

Wherein I Stake My Claim as an Individual of the Bourgeoisie

As enamored as I am with the word "proletariat," I must admit that ideologically speaking, I favor the establishment of the bourgeoisie--despite the plethora of "class antagonisms" that the latter supposedly creates. I find my identification with the bourgeois community to be humorous; I'm not attached to the "modern bourgeois" notion of private property, nor do I believe that the abolition of nations/nationality is an evil suggestion. No, what so irks me about the communist definition of the proletariat is that it denies the value of the individual to the greater community. "To be precise, it is...the negation of the individual as existent within the universal," Hegel argues. Therefore, according to Hegel, not only is the reality of the individual negligible when faced with the whole of collective human experience, but to acknowledge some value in this negligible entity is useless: "The sole work and deed of universal freedom is thus death...which has no inner amplitude and no inner fulfillment, since what is negated is the unfulfilled empty 'point' of the absolutely free self." Of course, no one wants a cold, empty death borne of individualism, so Marx and Engels wrote the manifesto for a society that could guarantee warm, full deaths for everyone.

One of the fundamental problems with Hegelian philosophy is that, like Kant, Hegel refuses to consider the effect of human instinct on human sensibility. Intellectually, he lays out a scintillating argument; in a way, our bourgeois, sociopolitical definition of "freedom" can be construed to mean the absence of guidance or human impact. However, freedom is not widely recognized as a canceling force in our lives because human instinct causes us to gravitate towards it, just as instinct allows for self-preservation, a hallmark of individual interest--the type of interest that Hegel would gladly negate. Predictably, individual interest is generated by none other than the self, to be precise, the intuitive, unconscious self which is not considered in the "highest actuality." Why not? Could it be that the self-consciousness which supposedly deconstructs universality informs the self-unconsciousness which composes it and vice versa, therefore leading even the least individualistic of people to a purely chemical individualism? Even by organic means, one can be lead back to the self; even in the work of Marx and Engels, there is room for the establishment of a new, possibly more organic self that both defies and supports the proletariat community.

At least bourgeois society recognizes the inevitable presence of the individual. "Class antagonisms" aside, the bourgeoisie allows an individualist to remain an individual, therefore creating a much more realistic society in which the self rationally contributes to the larger community.

I Hope This Concert is Worth the Money (709-717)

The period between 1815 and 1830 illustrated a trend that most of western Europe had been afraid of since the start of the French Revolution—an outward spread of revolutionary sentiments that would eventually extend overseas. Even though the Terror had seen a (bloody) conclusion and Napoleon’s imperialistic military campaigns had been brought to a halt by the defeat at Waterloo, the innovative rebelliousness of the French caught on as new splinter groups formed to challenge the imposed peace of the European establishment. In 1815, this “imposed peace” came in the form of the Congress of Vienna, a gathering of the major European powers seeking to restore “legitimate authority” to France, Spain, and the Sicilies; once more, the political landscape of Europe was dramatically altered by the monarchical forces of the restoration and the Quintuple Alliance. Naturally wary of crusades and non-representative governments, the restoration quickly gained opposition in the Carbonari, a group of tastefully disguised Italians who claimed to uphold democratic ideals while squelching Austrian rule. Although the Carbonari were by no means as elegant as Robespierre’s crew, there is a certain echo of the Terror in their uprisings, from their democratic claims to the violent nature of their revolts. Other revolutionary groups, such as the Decembrists in Russia, clearly learned from their run-in with Napoleon in 1812; they had no definite political program, but their extensive military experience and genius timing allowed them to affect a change in Russian authority that would shape the future of the nation. None of the aforementioned revolutions could compete with the sheer magnitude of the one in France, but France had surely left its mark on each incendiary effort that would follow.